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INTRODUCTION

Few would dispute that the constitutional relationship between the federal
government and the states occupied a central place on the Supreme Court’s docket during
the tenure of William Rehnquist as Chief Justice. In a series of highly publicized
decisions, the Rehnquist Court reinvigorated several federalism-based constraints on the
national government, narrowing the breadth of Congress’s legislative powers and
expanding the states’ immunity from federal regulation and from suits for damages. One
might argue that, in terms of practical consequences, these decisions were more
symbolic1 than revolutionary.2 But the Court clearly revived the salience of federalism as
a principle of constitutional law.
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By most accounts, Justice O’Connor played a central role in this “federalism
revival.” Drawing on her experience as a state judge and legislator in Arizona, the story
goes, O’Connor’s decisionmaking emphasized the importance of independent state
sovereignty within our constitutional system. She was a consistent member of the fivejustice majority that invalidated federal legislation as beyond Congress’s commerce
power; 3 that circumscribed Congress’s authority to enact legislation under section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment; 4 that struck down federal legislation that directed the states
to regulate in specific ways; 5 and that narrowed Congress’s capacity to the states to suits
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Affairs Debate Club, July 18, 2005 (available at
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July 27, 2005). Hills goes on to write that the Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions
imposed an “extremely modest brake on the centripetal tendencies of American
constitutional law,” and that “[f]rom the outset, the Court made it perfectly clear to
anyone who bothered to listen that its ambitions for trimming back on national powers
were modest and largely apolitical.” Id.
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for damages when they violate federal law.6 And some of O’Connor’s more notable
opinions—for instance, her majority opinions in Gregory v. Ashcroft7 and New York v.
United States8 and her dissents in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority9
and South Dakota v. Dole10—exalted the importance of preserving the prerogatives of
state governments as a counterweight to federal power.
Much of this storyline rings true. But as any student of American government
will tell you, there is more to federalism than the limits on Congress’s enumerated
powers. The Constitution also places structural limits on state power that are designed to
protect the interests of the nation as a whole. And in cases implicating these “unionpreserving” provisions11—the dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, the Import-Export Clause, the doctrine of intergovernmental
immunity, and, most significantly, the doctrine of preemption—O’Connor’s voting
record lacked a similar dedication to protecting the states’ independent policymaking
authority. In these cases, she essentially voted no differently than the average justice
with whom she served.
O’Connor’s approach to federalism was therefore more complicated than most
observers seem to have appreciated. To be sure, she consistently voted in favor of
enforcing the federalism-based limits on Congress’s legislative powers. But she was
6
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relatively ambivalent about preserving the states’ independent regulatory authority more
generally. That is, she did not seem to care any more than the average justice about the
states’ autonomy to regulate as they see fit in areas of overlapping federal and state
legislative jurisdiction.
This article presents a statistical summary of Justice O’Connor’s votes in the full
universe of cases addressing the Constitution’s federalism-based constraints on
governmental power. Specifically, it compares her voting record to those of the other
justices who sat in the same cases. The results suggest that O’Connor’s reputation as an
ardent proponent of state autonomy needs to be tempered, for it is only accurate with
respect to disputes about the powers of the national government. If we expand our
definition of federalism to include those disputes that involved the Constitution’s
structural limits on state power, her dedication to state autonomy seems relatively tepid.
In fact, an equally prominent theme—especially during her last eleven full terms on the
Court—is that she tended to disfavor government regulation of any sort, whether it
emanated from Congress or the states.
This is not to say that Justice O’Connor’s voting behavior was normatively or
jurisprudentially inconsistent; there may have been principled justifications for tending to
favor state policymaking autonomy in one context but not the other. Nor is it to suggest
that she consciously used the façade of federalism to accommodate a political preference
for less regulation; the nature of human decisionmaking is such that the “true” reasons for
a decision are often unknowable, especially to the decisionmaker herself.12 Rather, the
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point is strictly descriptive: in the full universe of decisions involving the constitutional
boundaries between federal and state power, O’Connor was comparatively protective of
state autonomy only in cases addressing the limits on congressional authority.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I briefly describes the Rehnquist Court’s
federalism revival and Justice O’Connor’s role in that project. Part II explains that,
given the breadth of Congress’s modern regulatory authority, the latitude afforded state
governments in areas of concurrent federal and state jurisdiction may actually be more
important to the values of federalism than enforcing of the outer limits of congressional
power. Thus, to gain a complete understanding of a justice’s attitude towards
constitutional federalism, we need to review those cases implicating the structural
provisions that constrain the states, not just those involving the limits on the national
government. Part III summarizes Justice O’Connor’s voting record in the entire universe
of federalism cases, so defined, comparing her votes to those of the justices with whom
she served. Finally, Part IV offers some observations about the study’s results. Most
interestingly, they show that O’Connor voted to limit regulation as frequently as she
voted to enhance state autonomy. In other words, across the full run of federalism cases,
O’Connor was as much a proponent of reducing government regulation as she was of
enhancing state autonomy.

PSYCHOL. SCI. AGENDA, Jan.–Feb. 2001, at 8, 8 (“Consciousness . . . permits a view of
who we are and what we are capable of that is independent of the knowledge and feelings
that may drive beliefs, attitudes, and behavior.”); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The
Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J.
1, 25–34 (2004) (reviewing literature on how human beings are largely unaware of the
many influences on their decisionmaing).
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I. THE FEDERALISM “REVIVAL”

This much is not news: the Rehnquist Court reshaped the constitutional rules
governing the respective roles of the national government and the states in our federal
republic.13 It articulated a new and arguably narrower standard for evaluating whether a
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Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J.
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federal statute falls within Congress’s commerce power.14 It developed a fairly
restrictive understanding of the breadth of Congress’s legislative authority under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring that such legislation be “congruent and
proportional” to the constitutional violations that Congress seeks to remedy or prevent.15
It minted the so-called “anticommandeering” principle, which prohibits Congress from
directing the states to enact or implement particular regulation.16 It held that Congress
cannot use its Article I powers to enact legislation subjecting the states to suits for
damages,17 overruling the relatively recent precedent of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas.18
And it extended this principle of sovereign immunity to suits brought in any court,
whether state or federal,19 as well as to adjudicative proceedings before federal
administrative agencies.20

Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002); Robert A.
Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243 (2005);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109
HARV. L. REV. 78 (1995); Keith E. Whittington, Taking What They Give Us: Explaining
the Court’s Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477 (2001); Ernest A. Young, The
Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2004).
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Aside from these constitutional rulings, the Rehnquist Court also invoked
federalism principles in several cases of statutory interpretation to limit the encroachment
of federal regulation on the states themselves or into areas historically regulated by the
states alone. For instance, in Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,21 the Court stated
that when “Congress intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States
and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in
the language of the statute.’”22 It therefore held that neither a state nor its officials, when
acting in their official capacities, were “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. §1983.23
Similarly, the Court held in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States24 that
a private individual could not bring a qui tam action against a state under the False
Claims Act because the states are not “persons” subject to suit under the Act. Alluding to
“the doctrine that statutes should be construed so as to avoid difficult constitutional
questions,” the Court noted that “there is ‘a serious doubt’” as to “whether an action in
federal court by a qui tam relator against a State would run afoul of the Eleventh
Amendment.”25

unseen in several generations. See, e.g., David Franklin, Marijuana and Judicial
Modesty, CHICAGO TRIB., June 9, 2005, at 27; Jeffrey Rosen, The End of Deference, NEW
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Id. at 71.
24
529 U.S. 765 (2000).
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Id. at 787. See also Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 858 (2000) (invoking the
same canon of constitutional doubt to hold that the federal arson statute, 18 U.S.C.
§844(i), does not apply to owner-occupied residences that have not been used for any
commercial purpose).
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Some have argued—and with some force—that the practical effects of the
Rehnquist Court’s federalism decisions have actually been quite modest.26 For instance,
the Court’s Commerce Clause decisions affect only a small spectrum of activity that
Congress might otherwise regulate—activity that is non-commercial, non-economic, and
purely intrastate. Its sovereign immunity decisions leave open a host of alternative means
for enforcing federal law against state governments, most notably suits for injunctions
under Ex Parte Young.27 And its anticommandeering decisions prohibit a form of
legislation that Congress had employed only rarely, and for which there are typically a
number of effective substitutes. Perhaps most significantly, the Rehnquist Court did
nothing to trim Congress’s authority under the Spending Clause, leaving Congress the
ability to circumvent most of these constraints by enacting conditional spending
legislation aimed at the states.28
Still, even if the Rehnquist Court’s decisions did not constitute a “federalism
revolution,” they seem to have done something. It is now clear (as it was not before
1995) that there are judicially enforceable limits on Congress’s commerce power,
particularly with respect to activities that have historically been regulated by the states.
Congress’s capacity to enact legislation to enforce the proscriptions of the Fourteenth
Amendment has been narrowed, such that any legislative effort to enforce a constitutional
right or to protect a class of citizens that the Court has not deemed deserving of
heightened judicial scrutiny is virtually per se invalid. And because Congress can
abrogate the sovereign immunity of states only through legislation enacted under the
26

See note 1 supra.
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
28
See Mark Tushnet, Alarmism vs. Moderation in Responding to the Rehnquist Court, 78
IND. L.J. 47, 52 (2003).
27
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Reconstruction Amendments, Congress has lost an important means for enforcing federal
law against the states. These consequences are not trivial.
Moreover, if the Rehnquist Court did not move the law in revolutionary directions
itself, it may nonetheless have laid the groundwork for a future Court to do so. As others
have noted, the newly constituted Roberts Court could use the Rehnquist Court’s
precedents to disrupt some long-settled constitutional understandings.29 It could hold that
landmark environmental legislation, such as the Endangered Species Act or the Clean
Water Act, is beyond Congress’s commerce power, at least in many of its applications,
because the regulated activity is not sufficiently connected to interstate commerce.30 It
could conclude that the anticommandeering decisions have effectively undermined
Garcia and hold that Congress cannot use its commerce power to regulate certain
functions of state governments. It could hold that the disparate impact provisions of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are unconstitutional as applied to state governments,
at least with respect to private suits for damages, because they are not “congruent and
proportional” to any purported constitutional violations.31 Or conceivably, though much
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See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 320–29.
See, e.g., GDF Realty Investments, Ltd. v. Norton, 362 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2004) (six
circuit judges dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc, suggesting that application of
the Endangered Species Act to a species of cave bugs in Texas is unconstitutional);
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (two judges, including
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of the Endangered Species Act to arroyo toads in California might be beyond Congress’s
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2005, available at http://www.lrb.co.uk/v27/n04/print/acke01_.html (last visited Aug. 10,
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supra note 13, at 326–27; Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:
Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 493, 494–95 (2003).
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less likely, it could hold that most federal anti-discrimination legislation is beyond
Congress’s commerce power because the regulated activity of discrimination—whether
based on race, gender, religion, age, or disability—is not “economic” or “commercial” in
nature.32
Whatever the ultimate significance of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism project,
the conventional wisdom seems to be that Justice O’Connor played a central role in its
development. When O’Connor announced her retirement in July 2005, assessments of
her legacy teemed with references to her views on the balance between federal and state
power. In its tribute, the New York Times editorial page mentioned her “strong support
for federalism,” and that “[s]he was fiercely protective of states’ rights.”33 Nina
Totenberg observed that O’Connor “became part of a conservative states-rights
majority,”34 while Linda Greenhouse wrote that she had been “a loyal ally” of Rehnquist
“in the court’s continuing reappraisal of the relationship between the states and the
federal government.”35 Academics echoed these views. A.E. Dick Howard said that “it
was O’Connor as much as Rehnquist . . . who revived the doctrine of states’ rights,”36
while John Yoo commented that O’Connor’s “signature issue, . . . that historians will
look back on, is that she really was the person who helped bring about and restore states’
rights and more of a balance of powers between the federal government and the state
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See TUSHNET, supra note 13, at 325–26.
Justice O’Connor, N.Y.TIMES, July 2, 2005, at A14.
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governments.”37 Stephen Wermeil’s view nicely summarizes the prevailing sentiment:
O’Connor was

strongly motivated by her own abiding faith in good government at the state level
and her belief that the Framers of the Constitution envisioned a genuine
partnership of shared powers between the federal government and the states. Her
experience as a state legislator and judge [gave] her a degree of trust in state
government and state courts that [went] well beyond that of her colleagues.38
There is a great deal of truth in these perceptions. Most prominently, O’Connor
joined each of the Rehnquist Court’s landmark decisions that invalidated acts of Congress
on federalism grounds.39 And unlike in other areas of the law, O’Connor rarely swung
over to the Court’s more liberal wing to form a majority coalition.40 In fact, in the last
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John Yoo, PBS, Newshour with Jim Lehrer, July 1, 2005 (trascript available at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/july-dec05/oconnor_7-1.html).
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Stephen J. Wermeil, O’Connor: A Dual Role: Introduction, 13 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP.
129, 139 (1991). See also Marci Hamilton, The Remarkable Legacy of Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor, FINDLAW, July 14, 2005 (available at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/hamilton/20050714.html) (writing of “Justice O’Connor's
belief in the decentralization of power in the constitutional scheme” and “in the
importance of preserving a sphere of regulation for the states that may well differ from,
and even pose a challenge to, the federal government’s larger public policy”); Rosen,
supra note 2, at 32 (referring to O’Connor’s “attachment to states’ rights” and “the
federalism revolution that O’Connor has led”); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley,
Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903, 928 (1994)
(calling O’Connor one of “federalism’s most enthusiastic proponents”); Ernest A. Young,
Just Blowing Smoke? Politics, Doctrine, and the Federalist Revival after Gonzales v.
Raich, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (calling O’Connor “the Court’s most consistently profederalism member”).
39
See notes 3–6 supra and accompanying text.
40
See Whittington, supra note 13, at 507. O’Connor’s only notable defections from the
typical, five-justice pro-state majority in cases involving the federalism-based limits on
Congress were in the two Eleventh Amendment decisions of Tennessee v. Lane and
Nevada v. Hibbs. See Part III.B infra.
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high-profile federalism decision of her tenure on the Court, Gonzales v. Raich,41
O’Connor authored a strident dissent from the Court’s holding that Congress could
regulate the possession of home-grown marijuana used exclusively for medicinal
purposes. While Justices Scalia and Kennedy sided with the pro-Congress majority,
O’Connor argued that such an application of the federal Controlled Substances Act
ventured into a sphere reserved exclusively to the states: “If the Court always defers to
Congress as it does today, little may be left to the notion of enumerated powers.”42
Moreover, in addition to authoring some of the more significant opinions in the
federalism revival,43 O’Connor used her opinions to advance fairly deep theoretical
justifications for federalism as an abiding constitutional principle—deeper than she
tended to develop in other contexts. In her dissent in FERC v. Mississippi,44 for instance,
O’Connor contended that “the 50 states serve as laboratories for the development of new
social, economic, and political ideas,”45 citing the examples of women’s suffrage,
unemployment insurance, minimum wage laws, no-fault auto insurance, and
environmental protection.46 She also argued that “federalism enhances the opportunity of
all citizens to participate in representative government”;47 citizens “cannot learn the
lessons of self-government if their local efforts are devoted to reviewing proposals
formulated by a faraway national legislature.”48 Finally, she posited that “our federal

41

125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
Id. at 2223 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
43
E.g., Kimel v. Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
44
456 U.S. 742 (1982).
45
Id. at 788 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
46
Id. at 788–89.
47
Id. at 789.
48
Id. at 790.
42
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system provides a salutary check on governmental power,” noting that “[u]nless we
zealously protect” these divisions of authority, “we risk upsetting the balance of power
that buttresses our basic liberties.”49 Or, as she wrote in Gregory v. Ashcroft, “[j]ust as
the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government
serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy
balance of power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse from either front.”50
In short, there is much to be said for the conventional view of O’Connor as a
strong defender of state autonomy. But the decisions on which these perceptions seem to
be based all addressed the Constitution’s structural limits on the national government.
From New York to Lopez to Garrett to Raich, the issue was whether Congress had
exceeded its enumerated powers, and thus impermissibly intruded on state sovereignty.
But, as explained further below, federalism is a two-way street. It is as much about the
structural limits on the states as those on the national government. Thus, a conception of
federalism that focuses solely on the breadth of the Congress’s authority is unduly
narrow, for it ignores the degree to which states can (or cannot) exercise policymaking
autonomy in areas of concurrent federal and state regulatory jurisdiction—which is to
say, most areas of modern American life.51 To gain a more complete picture, we need to
widen the lens of federalism, the point to which I now turn.

II. A BROADER CONCEPTION OF FEDERALISM
49

Id.
501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
51
See Fallon, supra note 13, at 431–33; Massey, supra note 13, at 502–12; Young, supra
note 13, at 130–34.
50
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In its plainest terms, federalism is a system of governance in which two distinct
governments simultaneously exercise sovereignty over the same population and
geographic territory. It implies a constitutionalized division of power between these two
centers of authority—between the national and state governments—with neither fully
answerable to the other, each independent sovereigns in certain respects, yet all part of
one nation.52 For this division of power to work in practice, there must be rules that
delineate the respective roles of the national and state governments. These rules need not
be enforced by the courts, nor must they be formally codified. But for a system of
government to be accurately characterized as federal, such rules must exist in one form or
another.53
More to the point, these rules must limit both centers of power, not just the
national government. While an unconstrained national government could potentially
swallow up the independent existence of the states—a point the Rehnquist Court
repeatedly emphasized—so, too, might the states act in ways that would effectively
52

See, e.g., Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375 (1958) (Frankfurter, J.) (“The
essence of a constitutionally formulated federalism is the division of political and legal
powers between two systems of government constituting a single Nation.”).
53
It is worth noting that federalism has no particular ideological valence. See Cross,
supra note 13, at 1307–1308 (“states’ rights arguments are not inherently ideological”).
Although it has generally been associated with conservative political causes over the
course of American history, that has not always been the case. Indeed, recent issues—
such as the medicinal use of marijuana, physician-assisted suicide, and gay marriage, not
to mention the presidential election dispute in Florida in 2000—have all involved
circumstances in which progressive political causes have embraced the principle of state
policymaking autonomy. Nor does the concept of federalism, in itself, dictate a specific
balance of power between the national government and the states. Of course, for a
system of federalism to be truly federalist, both centers of government must have some
independent existence. But beyond that minimum, authentically federal systems can
differ quite dramatically in the relative strengths of the national government and the
states.
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destroy the Union.54 Indeed, problems of this sort under the Articles of Confederation,
especially in commercial matters, were largely why the Constitution came into being.55
A principal defect of the Articles was that they did little to prevent the states from acting
in self-interested ways that undermined the interests of the nation as a whole. States
imposed various barriers to interstate commerce, such as protective tariffs on goods from
other states; they often failed to comply with the Continental Congress’s requisitions, the
chief mechanism for funding the federal government; they encroached on the federal
government’s authority, such as by entering into compacts with each other and signing
their own treaties with Indian tribes; and they disregarded international agreements that
the federal government had reached with other nations.56 In the words of James Madison,
the states had a “centrifugal tendency” to “fly out of their proper orbits and destroy the
order & harmony of the political system.”57 A chief purpose of the Constitution, then,
was to create a “firm union” that would preserve the “peace and liberty of the states”58—
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This was, of course, the animating idea behind the Court’s holding in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), that Maryland’s tax on the Bank of the United
States was unconstitutional. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote, to permit states such a
power would be “in its nature incompatible with, and repugnant to, the constitutional
laws of the Union.” Id. at 425.
55
See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at
132-61, 354-63, 393-429, 463-67 (1969). See also KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 123 (15th ed. 2004) (“the poor condition of American
commerce and the proliferating trade rivalries among the states were the immediate
provocations for the calling of the Constitutional Convention”).
56
See SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 55, at 123; GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET AL.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 9–10 (5th ed. 2005) (discussing Madison’s memorandum to
himself in April 1787 in preparation for the Constitutional Convention). See also 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 164 (Max Farrand ed., 1911)
(“Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal
authority; to violate national Treaties; to infringe the rights & interests of each other.”).
57
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 165 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911).
58
THE FEDERALIST No. 9, at 71 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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to reduce“[t]he interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States” that had become
“injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the
Confederacy.”59
Structural limits on state authority have thus been a central aspect of American
federalism from the beginning. And those limits, manifested in several distinct
constitutional provisions and doctrines, remain critical elements of our governmental
structure.60 The Supremacy Clause, through the doctrine of preemption, dictates that
validly enacted federal laws shall negate any state laws with which they conflict. The
dormant Commerce Clause generally nullifies state laws that discriminate against, or
place undue burdens on, interstate commerce. The Privileges and Immunities Clause of
Article IV forbids states from discriminating against the citizens of other states unless
there is a substantial reason for doing so, and the discrimination is substantially related to
that justification. The doctrine of intergovernmental immunity prohibits states from
directly regulating the federal government or enacting laws that discriminate against the
federal government’s interests.61 And the Import-Export and Duty of Tonnage Clauses
impose very specific constraints on the states’ taxing powers.
Cases involving these union-preserving aspects of federalism tend to receive less
attention than those addressing the breadth of Congress’s legislative authority. They are
often fact-specific, turning on the precise scope or purpose of the state or federal laws at
issue. They do not typically address broad constitutional principles. Still, the overall
59

THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 144–45 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
TRIBE, supra note 11, at §6–1, 1021.
61
See Davis v. Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 811 (1989). This doctrine, as
it affects government employees, is now codified in the Public Salary Tax Act, 4 U.S.C.
§111. The Supreme Court has held that the scope of the statutory prohibition and the
constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity are coterminous.
60
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trajectory of these decisions is quite important to the federal-state balance—perhaps even
more important to the underlying values of federalism than the high-profile cases
involving the limits on Congress’s enumerated powers, such as Lopez, Printz, or
Seminole Tribe.
Consider the most pervasive of these limitations on state power, the doctrine of
preemption. So long as Congress acts within its enumerated powers, it can displace state
law addressing the same subject, and it can do so in express or implied terms. The fields
regulated by the federal government have grown dramatically over the last century, such
that federal law now reaches into almost every corner of national life. From crime to
occupational safety to environmental protection, federal law governs private conduct that
generally was subject only to state control for the Nation’s first 150 years. Granted, some
of the Rehnquist Court’s decisions have narrowed the breadth of Congress’s legislative
powers. But they have done so only at the margins; Congress can still regulate any
activity that is economic or commercial in nature, as well as a good deal of activity that is
not.62
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As the Court clarified in Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2206 (2005),
noneconomic, noncommercial, purely intrastate activities are still subject to federal
regulation if Congress rationally “concludes that failing to regulate that class of activity
would undercut” a larger, comprehensive scheme that, taken as a whole, plainly regulates
interstate commerce. Id. at 2206. Moreover, Congress can cure any constitutionally
deficient statute by adding a “jurisdictional element”—language that ensures, on a caseby-case basis, that the regulated activity has a sufficient connection to interstate
commerce. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). In fact, this is precisely what happened in the wake of
the Court’s decision in Lopez. A year later, Congress amended the Gun-Free School
Zones Act to add eleven words to 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(2)(A), defining the relevant offense
as the knowing possession of “a firearm that has moved in or that otherwise affects
interstate or foreign commerce at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable
cause to believe, is a school zone.” Pub. L. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009, §657 (Sept. 30,
1996), codified at 18 U.S.C. §922(q)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
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Thus, in a post-New Deal, post-Great Society world, the vast majority of human
activity in the United States can be regulated by both the federal government and the
states. Consequently, the frequency with which the Supreme Court concludes that federal
statutes have displaced state law within this expansive realm of concurrent jurisdiction is
critical to the breadth and significance of the states’ residuary powers. To cite only a few
recent examples, it determines the states’ leeway to regulate the practices of health
maintenance organizations;63 whether states can regulate automobile emissions in an
effort to reduce greenhouse gases;64 whether states can use their investment and
procurement practices to express their moral objections to the human rights records of
foreign regimes;65 and the terms on which states can regulate the advertising and labeling
of tobacco products to promote the health of their citizens.66 These questions might be
considered narrow in a constitutional sense, but they are collectively quite important to
the states’ practical strength as centers of policymaking authority.
The contours of preemption doctrine, as well the other doctrines surrounding the
Constitution’s union-preserving federalism provisions, are therefore critical to the values
that federalism is supposed to promote—the values that Justice O’Connor often
highlighted. States can hardly operate as laboratories of democracy, or offer a diverse
63

See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004); Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans,
Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329 (2003); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355
(2002). See also Theodore W. Ruger, The United States Supreme Court and Health Law:
The Year in Review, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 528 (2004).
64
See Miguel Bustillo, Stakes High as State Targets Greenhouse Gas from Cars, L.A.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2004, at A1 (describing a California law that imposes such regulations,
and the car industry’s plan to enjoin enforcement on the ground that that the law is
preempted by federal fuel economy standards).
65
See Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000); Board of Trustees
v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989).
66
See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
505 U.S. 504 (1992).
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array of public goods, if their idiosyncratic policy initiatives are routinely displaced by
federal law. As Ernest Young has explained, “[t]he whole point of preemption is
generally to force national uniformity on a particular issue, stifling state-by-state diversity
and experimentation.”67 Preemption also pulls the relevant decisionmaking process
further away from the affected citizens, eliminating the solutions reached by state and
local communities and placing control of the issue in Washington.68 Moreover, to the
extent vibrant state autonomy operates as an important check on tyranny, preemption
undermines this objective by centralizing more control over public policy in one
government.69
In short, if we want a complete picture of a justice’s approach to constitutional
federalism, we need to look beyond the decisions addressing the limits of Congress’s
powers. We must also consider those cases involving the various union-preserving
provisions and doctrines that constrain state authority in areas where federal and state
regulatory powers overlap.70 As Justice Breyer has suggested, these cases arguably
present the “true test” of a justice’s commitment to state policymaking autonomy within
the modern framework of federalism.71
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Young, supra note 13, at 130.
S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic Republican Values, 71 B.U. L.
REV. 687, 694 (1991).
69
Young, supra note 13, at 132.
70
Young, supra note 13, at 131 (“[d]octrines limiting federal preemption of state law . . .
go straight to the heart of the reasons why we care about federalism in the first place”).
71
Justice Breyer’s full statement reads as follows: “[I]n today’s world, filled with legal
complexity, the true test of federalist principle may lie, not in the occasional
constitutional effort to trim Congress’ commerce power at the edges, or to protect a
State’s treasury from a private damages action, but rather in those many statutory cases
where courts interpret the mass of technical detail that is the ordinary diet of the law.”
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 160–161 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
68
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III. JUSTICE O’CONNOR’S VOTING RECORD IN FEDERALISM CASES

I am hardly the first person to notice the apparent tension in Justice O’Connor’s
approach to the two sides of federalism—that she seemed to care more about state
autonomy in cases involving the limits on Congress than she did in cases involving the
limits on state governments. Erwin Chemerinsky, Frank Cross, Richard Fallon, Michael
Greve, Jonathon Klick, Seth Kreimer, Calvin Massey, Daniel Meltzer, Robert Schapiro,
and Ernest Young—to name only a few—have made the same point about the five
justices at the heart of the Rehnquist Court’s federalism revival.72 To date, however, no
scholar has supported this assertion with a comprehensive summary of the justices’
voting records. This study does so, at least with respect to Justice O’Connor. It
compares her votes to those of the other justices in every federalism case in which
O’Connor participated during her tenure on the Court.

A.

Study design

The purpose of the study is to test the descriptive accuracy of the common
assumption that O’Connor tended to favor the states in cases involving constitutional
federalism. My hypothesis was that, although this claim seemed generally correct as to
cases involving the federalism-based limits on the national government, it did not
72

Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering the States When It Matters, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
1313, 1313–14 (2004); Cross, supra note 1, at 1310; Fallon, supra note 13, at 432;
Michael Greve & Jonathon Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court, 14 SUP. CT. ECON.
REV. 43 (2006); Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, 68 (2001); Massey, supra note 13, at 436; Meltzer, supra note 13, at
343–44; Schapiro, supra note 13, at ___; Young, supra note 13, at 23.
21

accurately characterize O’Connor’s behavior in cases implicating the structural limits on
the states. Because my hypothesis was purely descriptive, testing it only required a
statistical summary (rather than a regression or some other tool designed to derive
descriptive inferences).73
The first step in compiling the data was to define the relevant universe of
Supreme Court decisions. I included every case in which Justice O’Connor participated
where the holding involved a constitutional provision or constitutionally based doctrine
directly addressing the division of authority between the national government and the
states.74 And because my hypothesis was that O’Connor’s support for state autonomy

73

On the potential value of statistical summaries to empirical legal studies—and the
methodological rules governing their validity—see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules
of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 24–29 (2002).
74
The cases included in the study were identified in the following manner:
• First, I conducted searches in Westlaw’s Supreme Court database (SCT)
searching for references to one of the relevant constitutional provisions or
doctrines in the headnotes of opinions. Thus, I ran queries such as “he(“eleventh
amendment”),” “he(preempt!),” and “he (“commerce clause”)” for each of the
relevant provisions or doctrines.
• Second, I read the text of each opinion generated by these queries to determine
whether the Court’s holding—its ultimate legal judgment in the case—addressed
the provision or doctrine queried. In many cases it did not, as the opinion simply
referred to the relevant doctrine for other reasons, such as to draw an analogy.
Such cases were excluded from the universe.
• Third, my research assistant conducted searches in the Lexis-Nexis Supreme
Court database (U.S. Supreme Court Cases, Lawyers’ Edition) searching for
references to one of the relevant constitutional provisions or doctrines in the full
text of opinions. For instance, he ran the queries “(eleventh OR 11th) w/3
amendment” and “(tenth OR 10th) w/3 amendment.”
• Fourth, my research assistant then read these opinions and excluded those whose
holdings were clearly unrelated to the queried constitutional provisions or
doctrines, erring on the side of inclusion.
• Fifth, after my research assistant compiled lists of decisions involving the various
provisions and doctrines, I compared these lists to those that I had generated using
Westlaw. I read all of the cases on my research assistant’s lists that did not
appear on my lists.
22

varied depending on whether the constitutional provision at issue limited the national
government or the states, I separated the cases into these two basic categories. Thus, with
respect to the limits on the national government, the study included decisions where the
holding involved the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, the Tenth Amendment (or
the structural principles it confirms), the Eleventh Amendment (and the sovereign
immunity it implies), and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. With respect to the
limits on state governments, the study included decisions where the holding involved the
doctrine of preemption, the dormant Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV, the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, the Import-Export
Clause, and the Qualifications Clauses of Article I (to the extent they limit the states’
ability to regulate congressional elections).75
Admittedly, this universe excludes a number of decisions in which the justices’
views on federalism and state autonomy were relevant to the outcomes.76 But expanding
the scope of the study beyond these parameters would present a number of

•

Finally, I added to the study universe those cases discovered by my research
assistant (which I had not found in Westlaw) where the Court’s holding directly
addressed the queried provision or doctrine.
75
Every case included in the study universe is listed in the article’s appendix, infra,
separated by the constitutional provision or doctrine at issue and presented in reverse
chronological order.
76
For example, as discussed above, the Court on several occasions has invoked
federalism principles in cases of statutory interpretation outside the context of
preemption. In Solid Waste Agency v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159
(2001), for instance, the Court rejected the Corps’s interpretation of the Clean Water
Act—which extended the Act’s coverage to nonnavigable, intrastate waters—on the
ground that it raised “significant constitutional and federalism questions” as to the
breadth of Congress’s commerce power. Id. at 174. It is no coincidence that the five
justices adopting this construction of the statute were Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas, and that the four dissenters were Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer. The justices’ underlying views about the breadth of Congress’s commerce power
plainly shaped their readings of the statute.
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methodological complications. To state the obvious, virtually every case that the Court
decides has some ramifications for the breadth of the states’ policymaking autonomy.77
Including every case decided by the Court, however, would lump together cases in which
federalism was the predominant issue with those in which it was only marginally
relevant.78 A potential solution would be to include those cases in which the federalism
issues seemed sufficiently salient, but it would be difficult (perhaps impossible) to devise
selection criteria that would be both objective and meaningful. And absent such
objective criteria for defining the universe, the study would violate the important standard
of replication.79
Next, I devised a structure for the data summary that would illuminate whether
Justice O’Connor tended to favor state autonomy. Merely tabulating the percentage of
her votes that enhanced state autonomy would tell us precious little. For instance, as the
summary below shows, O’Connor voted for the outcome enhancing state autonomy in 48
percent of the cases involving the federalism-based limits on the states. By itself, though,
this does not demonstrate whether O’Connor tended to support state autonomy, tended to
77

In the area of criminal procedure, for instance, the dramatic expansion of the rights
afforded to criminal defendants as a matter of federal constitutional law over the last fifty
years has—for better or worse—substantially curtailed the states’ freedom to experiment
and resolve these questions as they see fit. See generally William Stutz, Police Powers,
NEW REPUBLIC, July 25, 2005, at 20.
78
For instance, federalism seems quite important in some of the Court’s habeas corpus
decisions, but it is essentially inapposite in others. Compare Coleman v. Thompson, 501
U.S. 722 (1991), where Justice O’Connor famously began her opinion with the sentence
“This is a case about federalism,” id. at 727, with Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000), which involved a careful parsing of the various ways in which the Anti-Terrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act amended the standards for habeas relief articulated in 28
U.S.C. §2254.
79
On the importance of empirical work adhering to the replication standard—ensuring
that “another researcher should be able to understand, evaluate, build on, and reproduce
the research without any additional information from the author”—see Epstein & King,
supra note 73, at 38–45.
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oppose it, or was ambivalent about it. Needless to say, a host of other variables or
influences could have affected her votes in the remaining 52 percent of the cases, all of
which might be fully consistent with various attitudes about state autonomy. More to the
point, the raw figure of 48 percent would mean something quite different depending on
the context of her colleagues’ behavior. If the other justices who sat in the same cases
cast only 20 percent of their votes in favor of state autonomy, O’Connor would look like
a strong ally of the states; but if 70 percent of her colleagues’ votes in those cases favored
the states, O’Connor would instead appear quite hostile to state autonomy.
The summary therefore captures Justice O’Connor’s relative commitment to state
autonomy. It compares her votes to those of the other eight justices who sat in precisely
the same universe of federalism cases. As a result, all of the potentially relevant
variables—the various legal texts and precedent, the preferences of other institutional
actors, the policy consequences of the different outcomes, the quality of the parties’
advocacy, etc.—are effectively held constant. Given identical stimuli, how often did
Justice O’Connor, compared to her colleagues, vote for outcomes that enhanced state
autonomy? My central premise is that, if O’Connor deserves her reputation, she should
have voted for the states in federalism decisions at a higher rate than the average of the
other justices who sat in the same cases.
The summary covers two distinct, overlapping time frames. The first is Justice
O’Connor’s entire 24-plus terms on the Court, from October 1981 to January 2006. Over
this period, comparisons of O’Connor’s record to those of other individual justices are
fairly complicated, as they are only valid to the extent of concurrent service. Moreover,
each would be only partially revealing of O’Connor’s position relative to the rest of the
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Court. Instead, the summary compares her votes to the cumulative record of the other
justices sitting in the same cases, comparing her record to the average of the other justices
with whom she served. The second time period is October 1994 to July 2005. I include
this as a distinct frame of reference because the same nine justices served together for
these eleven terms. The fortuity of this long-serving “natural court” allows us to compare
O’Connor’s federalism record to that of other specific justices in a large universe of
decisions.
For every case in the universe, I coded the vote of each justice as either enhancing
state autonomy (1) or reducing it (0). In most instances, this was simple.80 Nevertheless,
three issues are worth mentioning. First, nine cases presented two separate federalism
issues that addressed distinct constitutional provisions or doctrines. For example, in
United States v. Morrison, the Court addressed two questions: (1) whether the civil
remedy provision of the Violence Against Women Act was within Congress’s commerce
power, and (2) whether it was valid legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In cases like this, I treated the justices’ positions on the two issues as two
separate votes (and coded each as 1 or 0).81 Because the different issues were essentially
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For example, I coded the five votes to invalidate the Gun-Free School Zones Act in
Lopez as enhancing state autonomy, as this result left the regulation of the relevant
activity exclusively to the states. Likewise, I coded the five votes to hold that
Massachusetts’s regulations governing cigarette advertising were preempted by the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly as
reducing state autonomy, as this result curtailed the states’ capacity to regulate tobacco
products.
81
Thus, the number of votes by O’Connor included in the study is 246, which she
participated in 237 cases.
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independent, treating them as separate votes seemed the best reflection of the justices’
behavior.82
Second, some cases presented multiple claims raised under the same
constitutional provision or doctrine. In several preemption cases, for example, the Court
addressed whether a variety of state law actions were preempted by federal law. In these
cases, I treated a justice’s split vote—typically, a vote that one claim was preempted
while another one was not—as half of a vote for each outcome (and thus coded it as 0.5).
This follows the protocol of another recent empirical study of the Rehnquist Court’s
voting patterns in preemption cases.83 This is essentially an arbitrary judgment, but
treating each claim within a preemption case as a separate case risked distorting the
results through an overpopulation of preemption votes.84
Finally, some cases defied simple classification as to the constitutional provision
at issue. For instance, in Board of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court held that Congress had
not validly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity from private suits for damages
because Title I of the ADA was not valid Section 5 legislation. One might deem this
either an Eleventh Amendment decision or a Section 5 decision, but including it in both
would double-count a single vote. Thus, I simply assigned these cases to one category or
the other. (I classified Garrett and similar decisions, for example, as Eleventh
Amendment cases.) Such judgments about categorization are only matters of form, as the
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Because only nine cases presented two distinct issues, this choice of treatment has only
a minor impact on the study’s overall results.
83
See Greve & Klick, supra note 72, at ___.
84
Again, the number of such cases is rather small, so the choice of treatment has only a
minor impact on the overall results.
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study ultimately combines Eleventh Amendment and Section 5 cases under the broader
heading of federalism decisions involving the limits on the national government.
It is worth noting that, because the study aims to describe the justices’ behavior
by tallying their votes favoring one outcome or another, it suffers from the same
shortcomings as other studies employing similar vote-counting, outcome-focused
methodologies.85 First, it ignores what the justices have actually written in their opinions.
And at the Supreme Court of the United States, the content of the opinions can be just as
important—indeed, much more important—than whether the judgment under review is
affirmed, reversed, or vacated.86 For example, in the 2004 case of Tennessee v. Lane,87
the Court held that Congress had validly abrogated the states’ sovereign immunity in
enacting Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, at least with respect to its
application to state judicial facilities. The vote was 5–4, and Justice O’Connor joined the
majority. I therefore coded her vote as reducing state autonomy.
But focusing exclusively on the outcome her vote supported misses much of what
happened in Lane. The majority substantially limited the scope of its holding
(presumably to hold O’Connor’s vote) by only addressing Title II’s application to state
courthouses. The Court did not address the much broader question, pressed by the
parties, as to whether Title II validly abrogates state immunity when applied to the
thousands of other public accommodations covered by the ADA. Thus, while O’Connor
85

On the weaknesses inherent in such studies, see Frank B. Cross, Thomas A. Smith &
Antonio Tomarchio, The Reagan Revolution in the Network of Law, at 7–8 (2006)
(working paper available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=909217);
Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICS 261, 265–266
(2006).
86
See Friedman, supra note 85, at 265–266 (discussing the importance of the content of
Supreme Court’s opinions in evaluating the significance of the Court’s work).
87
541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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sided with Congress, she did so on limited terms, a nuance that binary vote counting
necessarily misses.
By presenting O’Connor’s voting record in federalism cases relative to the
justices with whom she served, I have substantially mitigated this problem. Regardless
of how the majority framed the question in a given case, the justices voted in ways that
expressed their relative preferences. For instance, one might question whether
O’Connor’s vote in Lane was unfavorable to state autonomy in an absolute sense, but it
clearly was less protective of state autonomy than to those registered by Rehnquist,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Still, had Justice Stevens (the majority opinion writer)
framed the issue more broadly, O’Connor might well have switched sides. That is,
Stevens’s discretionary choices about the content of his opinion may well have altered
O’Connor’s vote. Thus, focusing on the justices’ relative voting records does not solve
the problem entirely; some votes to affirm or reverse (as opposed to just decisions to
concur separately) probably depend on the content of the Court’s opinions.
Another weakness of outcome-based vote counting is that it places equal weight
on each decision, even though some cases are clearly more significant than others. The
Court’s decision in Lopez to hold for the first time in sixty years that Congress had
exceeded its authority under the Commerce Clause seems a more important data point in
measuring the justices’ respective views on federalism than its decision in California v.
Deep Sea Research, Inc.88 that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal jurisdiction
over in rem admiralty actions when the state does not possess the property at issue.
Again, one could try to weight the cases according to some assessment of their relative
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523 U.S. 491 (1998).
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significance, but doing so would raise the same issue of replication discussed earlier. By
not doing so, though, we obviously sacrifice a finer grained appreciation of the
importance of the justices’ various votes.
But these weaknesses should not be overstated. Outcomes may be a rather crude
measure of the Court’s decisional output,89 but they can still tell us a great deal about
patterns of judicial behavior. After all, the outcome a justice supports in a given case is
often—perhaps even typically—the most revealing single piece of information about her
views on the issue. Moreover, focusing on outcomes allows us to record the justices’
positions quite objectively, reducing the potential for various biases in our data
collection. Of course, outcome-based studies cannot answer all the interesting questions
we have about judicial decisionmaking.90 But they nonetheless can constitute a
significant part of the mix of methodological tools that shed light on the Court’s
behavior.91

B.

Results

1.

October 1981 to January 2006
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See Cross, Smith & Tomarchio, supra note 85, at 7 (describing outcome-based studies
as “a very crude measure of Supreme Court output”).
90
See Friedman, supra note 85, at 265–266.
91
See Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test the
“Legal Model” of Judicial Decisionmaking, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 494–495 (2001)
(describing the importance of such studies, even if they should be supplemented with
historical and interpretivist inquiries).
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From October 1981, when O’Connor was sworn in Associate Justice, until
January 2006, when she was replaced by Samuel Alito, O’Connor participated in 239
federalism decisions, casting 248 votes (as counted under the terms discussed earlier).
Fifty-seven of these votes addressed the structural limits on the national government’s
power. O’Connor cast 67 percent of her votes in these cases to invalidate the action of
the national government, and thus in favor of enhancing state autonomy. As Table 1
shows, this was a significantly higher rate than that of her fellow justices.
Table 1
Votes in Favor of State Autonomy in Federalism Cases Addressing the Limits on
the National Government—All Decisions, October 1981 to January 2006
O'Connor

Other justices

Eleventh Amendment

64%
(n=39)

38%
(n=308)

Tenth Amendment

67%
(n=9)

24%
(n=72)

Commerce Clause

60%
(n=5)

25%
(n=40)

Section 5

100%
(n=2)

71%
(n=14)

Spending Clause

50%
(n=2)

6%
(n=16)

TOTAL

67%
(n=57)

35%
(n=450)

O’Connor’s record of favoring state autonomy in these cases is even clearer if we
confine our review to the Court’s non-unanimous decisions. In the 39 such cases
(yielding 40 distinct votes), O’Connor was substantially more likely to vote for the result
enhancing the states’ autonomy than her colleagues: 88 percent of her votes were to

31

invalidate the federal action at issue, compared to a rate of 45 percent among the other
justices (n = 318). This is entirely consistent with her popular reputation as a strong
supporter of the states’ independent sovereignty and autonomy.
The picture is quite different in federalism cases involving the structural limits on
state authority. Over her full tenure on the Court, O’Connor participated in 185 cases in
which a state law was challenged on federalism grounds, yielding 192 distinct votes.
Roughly half of O’Connor’s votes in these cases—52 percent, precisely—were to
invalidate the state law at issue. As Table 2 illustrates, this was essentially
indistinguishable from the average voting record of her colleagues.
Table 2
Votes in Favor of State Autonomy in Federalism Cases Addressing the Limits on
State Governments—All Decisions, October 1981 to January 2006
O'Connor

Other justices

Preemption

48%
(n=127)

48%
(n=991)

Dormant Commerce Clause

46%
(n=48)

42%
(n=366)

Intergovernmental immunity

43%
(n=5)

50%
(n=52)

Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV

17%
(n=6)

19%
(n=48)

Import-Export Clause

100%
(n=3)

100%
(n=23)

Qualifications Clauses

100%
(n=1)

38%
(n=8)

48%
(n=192)

47%
(n=1488)

TOTAL
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Isolating the non-unanimous decisions reveals the same basic picture: in cases
involving the federalism-based limits on the states, O’Connor’s voting record over her
full tenure on the Court was no different than the average remaining justice. She cast 46
percent of her 108 votes in these cases to uphold the state law at issue, compared to an
average of 45 percent among the remaining justices (n = 837).

2.

October 1994 to July 2005

The same dichotomous pattern holds for O’Connor’s last eleven full terms on the
Court, though her record in the union-preserving federalism cases is even more
intriguing. From October 1994 to July 2005, the Court decided 25 cases involving the
limits on Congress’s enumerated powers, yielding 27 distinct votes. As Table 3
illustrates, the justices’ voting patterns in these cases conform to the common perception
of the Rehnquist Court: Rehnquist, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas typically
voted to invalidate the assertion of federal authority at issue, while Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer typically dissented.
Table 3
Votes in Favor of State Autonomy in Federalism Cases Addressing the Limits on the National
Government—All Decisions, October 1994 to June 2005
(n = 27)

Issue

Souter

Breyer

Stevens

Ginsburg

Eleventh Amendment (n=17)
Commerce Clause (n=5)
Section 5 (n=2)
Tenth Amendment (n=2)
Spending Clause (n=1)

6%
0%
0%
0%
0%

6%
0%
0%
0%
0%

6%
0%
50%
0%
0%

12%
0%
50%
0%
0%

71% 65% 71% 82% 82%
40% 60% 60% 40% 60%
100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%

Total (n=27)

4%

4%

7%

11%

63%
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Kennedy

O'Connor

63%

Rehnquist

67%

Scalia

70%

Thomas

74%

The Court’s polarization is even clearer when we limit our review to its nonunanimous decisions. In these 17 cases (yielding 18 votes), the Court almost always split
5–4 along the same lines. Justice O’Connor’s record in these cases thus substantiates her
reputation as a strong proponent of state autonomy. Over these eleven terms, there were
only three non-unanimous decisions in which O’Connor voted to uphold the exercise of
federal authority: Nevada v. Hibbs, Tennessee v. Lane, and Tennessee Student Assistance
Corp. v. Hood.
Table 4
Votes in Favor of State Autonomy in Federalism Cases Addressing the Limits on the National
Government—Non-unanimous Decisions, October 1994 to June 2005
(n = 18)

Percentage of votes in favor of state autonomy (to invalidate federal
legislation)

120%

100%

100%

94%
89%
83%

83%

Kennedy

O'Connor

80%

60%

40%

20%

6%
0%

0%

0%

0%

Souter

Breyer

Stevens

Ginsburg

Justice
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Rehnquist

Scalia

Thomas

Again, O’Connor’s record was quite different in cases addressing the federalismbased limits on the states. Over the same time period, the Court decided 55 cases
involving the constitutional provisions constraining state power, yielding 57 distinct
votes. More than two-thirds of these votes (42) involved the doctrine of preemption. In
these state-limiting cases, Justice O’Connor was hardly sympathetic to the states’ policy
initiatives—indeed, she was the justice least likely to sustain the assertion of state
authority.
Table 5
Votes in Favor of State Autonomy in Federalism Cases Addressing the Limits on
State Governments—All Decisions, October 1994 to June 2005

(n = 57)
Issue

Souter

Breyer

Stevens

Ginsburg

Kennedy

O'Connor

Rehnquist

Scalia

Thomas

Preemption (n=42)

55%

55%

58%

58%

40%

38%

46%

42%

54%

Dormant Commerce Clause (n=11)

36%

27%

36%

45%

36%

36%

55%

45%

64%

Privileges and Immunities Clause (n=2)

0%

0%

0%

50%

50%

0%

50%

0%

0%

100%

0%

100%

100%

100%

0%

100%

100%

100%

Qualifications Clauses (n=1)

0%

0%

0%

0%

0%

100%

100%

100%

100%

Total (n=57)

49%

46%

52%

55%

40%

37%

50%

44%

55%

Intergovernmental tax immunity (n=1)

O’Connor’s indifference to state autonomy in this context is even starker when we
isolate the Court’s non-unanimous decisions. In the 27 cases since October 1994 in
which the Court disagreed over the application of a federalism-based limit on the states,
O’Connor cast only 7.5 votes (28 percent) to uphold the challenged state law. As Table 6
shows, this was a lower rate than any of the justices with whom she usually kept
company in cases involving the other side of federalism. In other words, in decisions in
which the justices disagreed, O’Connor cast nearly three-fourths of her votes in favor of
invalidating the state law, the highest rate on the Court.
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Table 6
Votes in Favor of State Autonomy in Federalism Cases Addressing the Limits on
State Governments—Non-unanimous Decisions, October 1994 to June 2005
(n = 27)

Percentage of votes in favor of state autonomy (to uphold state law)

80%

70%

67%

65%

59%

60%
54%
50%

48%

46%

42%
40%
35%

30%

28%

20%

10%

0%
Souter

Breyer

Stevens

Ginsburg

Kennedy
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O'Connor

Rehnquist

Scalia

Thomas

IV. DISCUSSION

In her first public address after announcing her retirement, Justice O’Connor said
that she viewed the states as “laboratories”: we should “let them try things and see how it
works.”92 The sentiment is one commonly associated with O’Connor, but it is not one
that she consistently expressed in her voting record as a justice, at least in cases directly
presenting federalism questions. To be sure, O’Connor consistently voted for results that
protected state prerogatives in cases implicating the structural limits on the national
government. But in cases involving the Constitution’s union-preserving federalism
provisions—its structural limits on the states—she did not show a similar inclination to
“let them try things.” In these cases, her record was essentially indistinguishable from
the average justice with whom she served.
If O’Connor was not the ardent proponent of state autonomy that many have
presumed, are there alternative descriptions that capture her behavior in the full universe
of federalism cases? Developing a positive theory of O’Connor’s approach to
federalism—whether quantitative or qualitative—would require the aggregation of
additional data and the application of more sophisticated methods, both of which go
beyond the scope of my study here. But let me at least suggest a line of inquiry—one
that would be fully consistent with the priorities of the Republican Party of the late
twentieth century that propelled O’Connor onto the Court.
Aside from conceptualizing federalism cases as presenting a choice between more
or less state autonomy, we might also see them as presenting choices about the extent of
92

Ralph Thomas, Retiring Justice Worries About Loss of States’ Rights, SEATTLE TIMES,
July 22, 2005, at A1.
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government regulation generally. Whether they involve the breadth of Congress’s
enumerated powers or the union-preserving limits on the states, at stake are limits on the
government’s power to regulate. Of course, when the Court holds that that a state law
has been preempted—and often when it concludes that a state law violates the dormant
Commerce Clause—federal regulation of the same activity remains in place. But a
judgment invalidating the state law necessarily reduces the aggregate level and stringency
of the regulation of that activity. In other words, every federalism case presents some
version of a choice between more or less regulation.
From this perspective, we can derive an alternative characterization O’Connor’s
voting record in federalism cases: a general disposition towards reducing government
regulation, regardless of its source.93 To demonstrate this, we need to adjust the coding
of the justices’ votes only slightly. No adjustment is necessary for the cases involving the
limits on the national government, as a vote in favor of state autonomy in this context
also favors reducing the government’s regulatory authority. We simply need to reverse
the coding of the cases involving the federalism-based limits on the states, as a vote
favoring state autonomy in this context is one to uphold a greater level of regulation.
With these adjustments in mind, consider again Justice O’Connor’s 148 votes in
non-unanimous federalism cases over her 24-plus terms on the Court: 63 percent of those
votes favored a reduction in government regulation, while the average among the other

93

Others, such as Frank Cross and Richard Fallon—taking a bluntly political view of the
Rehnquist Court’s behavior—have noted the deregulatory valence to aspects of the
Court’s federalism project. See Cross, supra note 1, at 1322–1324 (describing the
deregulatory nature of the Rehnquist Court’s 1999 federalism decisions that limited the
legislative authority of Congress); Fallon, supra note 13, at 470–471 (positing that “the
substantive conservatism of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy” may well lead “them to
view the Commerce Clause as embodying antiregulatory, procompetitive ideals”).
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justices sitting in the same cases was 52 percent. Thus, her distance from the average
voting record of the other justices was essentially the same along the two dimensions of
greater state autonomy and less government regulation. That is, she was 12 percent more
likely than her colleagues to vote for outcomes that enhanced state autonomy, and she
was 11 percent more likely than her colleagues to vote for outcomes that reduced the
stringency of government regulation.
Table 7
Votes in Non-unanimous Federalism Cases—October 1981 to January 2006
O'Connor
(n=148)

Other justices
(n=1155)

Votes to invalidate regulation

63%

52%

Votes in favor of state autonomy

57%

45%

The deregulatory nature of O’Connor’s voting record in federalism cases was
especially pronounced in her last eleven full terms on the Court. She cast 34.5 of her 45
votes in these cases (77 percent) to invalidate the regulation at issue, whether it emanated
from the federal government or the states. Thus, from October 1994 to July 2005,
O’Connor’s voting record in federalism cases was the single most hostile on the Court to
government regulation.
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Table 8
Votes in Favor of Reducing Regulation or Regulatory Authority in Federalism Cases Combined
—Non-unanimous Decisions, October 1994 to June 2005
(n = 45)
90%

Percentage of votes to reduce regulation or regulatory authority

80%

77%
73%

72%
70%

67%
61%

60%

50%

40%
32%
30%

28%
24%

22%

20%

10%

0%
Souter

Breyer

Stevens

Ginsburg

Kennedy

O'Connor

Rehnquist

Scalia

Thomas

Again, these statistics alone do not support the inference that O’Connor voted as
she did because of a preference to reduce government regulation; my claims here are
purely descriptive. Still, the findings are interesting, if not altogether surprising. First,
O’Connor’s tendency to support state autonomy—though greater than the average
justice—only manifested itself in cases involving the limits on the federal government;
she was no more protective of state autonomy than the average justice in cases involving
the structural limits on the states. Second, in the full run of federalism cases, O’Connor
voted as frequently to reduce regulation as she did to enhance state policymaking
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autonomy, and she did so much more frequently over her last eleven full terms on the
Court.

CONCLUSION

In his pathbreaking 1957 article “Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a National Policy-Maker,” Robert Dahl wrote that “the policy views dominant
on the [Supreme] Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant
among the lawmaking majorities of the United States.”94 More recently, a number of
political scientists have extended and refined Dahl’s thesis, forming a school of thought
commonly known as the “regime politics” approach to judicial behavior. The basic
theory—advanced by such scholars as Mark Graber, Howard Gillman, Cornell Clayton,
Mitch Pickerill, Keith Whittington, and Terri Peretti—is that the Court’s power and
substantive views are deliberately constructed by the dominant national political
coalition. Though the Court certainly exercises independent judgment on a case-by-case
basis, its general ideological direction is shaped by political developments external to the
Court. Constitutional evolution is more the product of shifts in the governing national
coalition than the occasion of the justices finally being won over by particular legal
arguments. Thus, the Court is best conceived as an integral policy-making partner of the
ascendant political majority, or at least an influential segment of that majority.95

94

Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957).
95
There are two principal mechanisms by which this might occur. First, the President
and the Senate select justices based largely on their ideology, ensuring that the justices’
substantive views will tend to reflect those of the dominant coalition at the time of their
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Regime politics theory might be better suited to explain the behavior of the Court
as a whole than the actions of a single justice. But Justice O’Connor’s voting record in
federalism cases largely resembles the political priorities of the conservative movement
that gave rise to her career. While the Republican Party of the last thirty years has often
emphasized the importance of the independent sovereignty of the states, it has generally
done so by advocating for enforcement of the structural limits on Congress’s authority
and for a reduction of the size of the federal government.96 To be sure, GOP thought on
the subject has not been monolithic, and those genuinely committed to state autonomy
have achieved some policy successes, such as the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of
1995.97 But the modern Republican Party as a whole has never embraced a broader
constitutional program to substantially enhance the legislative autonomy of the states.98
This seems especially true in the area of commercial regulation. Consider such GOP
initiatives as the decades-long effort to enact federal tort reform legislation (recently
resulting in the Class Action Fairness Act99), the inclusion of express preemption clauses

nominations. Second, regardless of the views that they take to the bench, the Court as an
institution is substantially constrained by the preferences of the contemporary Congress
and President. Without the sword or the purse, the justices must be cognizant—
consciously or unconsciously—of the views of the extant political regime in making their
decisions.
96
See Pickerill & Clayton, supra note 13, at 236–239 (discussing the Republican Party’s
federalism initiatives since the 1970s).
97
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, 2 U.S.C. §§1501–1538, 1571 (2000).
98
For instance, consider such Republican-sponsored initiatives as the Defense of
Marriage Act, Pub. L. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996); the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107–110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002); the effort to intervene in the Terri
Schiavo saga, To Provide for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L.
No. 109–3 (2005); and the Department of Justice’s attempts to undercut California’s
legalization of medical marijuana, see Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), and
Oregon’s legalization of physician-assisted suicide, see Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct.
904 (2006).
99
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–2, 119 Stat. 4.
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in numerous Republican-sponsored statutes,100 and the use of agency rulemaking by the
present Bush Administration to preempt wide swaths of state law, just to name a few.101
Justice O’Connor clearly cared about federalism, and she clearly believed in the
judicial enforcement of the structural limits on the national government. But her voting
record in cases involving the federalism-based constraints on state governments did not
reveal a particular concern for state policymaking autonomy more generally. Like the
political coalition that placed her on the Court—or at least an influential aspect of that
coalition—she tended to favor outcomes that enhanced state autonomy, but to no greater
degree than she favored outcomes that reduced the stringency of government regulation.
In this way, she appears to have reflected the priorities of the modern Republican Party, a
fact we should probably find unsurprising.

100

See, e.g., Department of Defense Appropriations Act for 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–148
(preempting state tort law with respect to injuries from certain drugs and vaccines);
Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, Pub. L. No. 109–92 (preempting state
authority to file civil actions against gun manufacturers); Energy Policy Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109–58 (preempting various state environmental protections); CAN SPAM
Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108–187 (preempting state laws regulating unsolicited e-mail spam);
Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–159 (preempting
some state credit reporting and identity theft laws).
101
See Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the
Federalization of Tort Reform, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=900020 (discussing efforts to
preempt state laws through rulemaking by the Food and Drug Administration, the
Consumer Products Safety Commission, and the National Highway and Transportation
Safety Administration). See also Stephen Labaton, ‘Silent Tort Reform’ Is Overriding
States’ Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2006, at C5.
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Appendix
The following is a list of all the cases that were included in the study, sorted by
subject matter, and presented in reverse chronological order.
DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE LIMITS ON THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
Commerce Clause
Gonzalez v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005)
Guillen v. Pierce County, 537 U.S. 129 (2005)
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000)
United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000)
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 307 (1997)
Tenth Amendment
Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000)
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)
South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988)
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985)
Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983)
EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983)
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982)
United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982)
Spending Clause
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004)
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)
Eleventh Amendment
Central Virginia Comm. Coll. V. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006)
United States v. Georgia, 126 S. Ct. 877 (2006)
Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004)
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004)
Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431 (2004)
Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)
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FMC v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002)
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. System of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002)
Raygor v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533 (2002)
Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001)
Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)
College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999)
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999)
California v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998)
Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997)
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425 (1997)
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)
Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (1994)
Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993)
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991)
Blatchford v. Native Village of Notak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991)
McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18 (1990)
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299 (1990)
Hoffman v. Conn. Dep’t of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96 (1989)
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989)
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989)
Welch v. Texas Dep’t of Highways & Public Transp., 483 U.S. 468 (1987)
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986)
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64 (1985)
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)
Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985)
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderma, 465 U.S. 89 (1984)
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983)
Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982)
Florida Dep’t of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670 (1982)
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of the State of Fla., 457 U.S. 496 (1982)
Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982)
DECISIONS ADDRESSING THE UNION-PRESERVING LIMITS ON THE STATES
Intergovernmental Immunity
Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (1999)
Barker v. Kansas, 503 U.S. 594 (1992)
North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990)
Cal. State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U.S. 844 (1989)
Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803 (1989)
Goodyear Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174 (1988)
Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182 (1987)
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Import-Export Clause
Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993)
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130 (1986)
Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984)
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, §2
Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59 (2003)
Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998)
Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989)
Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988)
Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985)
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984)
Dormant Commerce Clause
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, No. 03-1230 (2005)
Granholm v. Heald, 125 S. Ct. 1885 (2005)
Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59 (2003)
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003)
Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 528 U.S. 458 (2000)
South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999)
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997)
General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997)
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996)
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995)
Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175 (1995)
Barclays Bank PLC v. Francise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U.S. 298 (1994)
W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994)
Assoc. Indus. v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994)
C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994)
Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994)
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. County of Kent, 510 U.S. 355 (1994)
Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60 (1993)
Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue and Fin., 505 U.S. 71 (1992)
Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992)
Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353 (1992)
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992)
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992)
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992)
Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358 (1991)
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324 (1989)
Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493 (1989)
Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989)

46

Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988)
New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988)
D.H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988)
Am. Trucking Ass’n v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987)
Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987)
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987)
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986)
Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986)
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986)
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985)
Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984)
Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638 (1984)
South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984)
Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983)
Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983)
White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983)
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